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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENT W. HOLMAN and 
ALFRED G. KESSLER, dba 
GOLDEN SPIKE REALTY 
and CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLAIR W. SORENSON and 
MARJEAN SORENSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 14305 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, Kent w. Holman and Alfred G. Kessler, 
Contractors doing business as Golden Spike Realty and 
Construction, filed suit against the Appellants' for the 
foreclosure of a mechanics lien; for damages for the breach 
of a construction contract and for attorneys fees, court 
costs and punitive damages. The Defendants counterclaimed 
asserting breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District court found that the Appellants' 
had breached the contract and awarded plaintiffs the sum 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of $7,321.00. The Court also found that the plaintiffs 
breached the contract and held that each of the parties 
should bear their own attorney's fees and costs. The court 
foreclosed the lien of the plaintiffs and one asserted by 
Fashion cabinets Manufacturing, inc., which had priority, 
and stayed execution of the judgment for six months. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs ask the court to affirm the judg-
ment of the Trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Alfred G. Kessler and Kent w. Holman, plaintiffs 
below, operated as a partnership under the name of Golden 
Spike Realty and construction. Mr. Blair sorenson, who 
wished to construct a fourplex on Green Street in Salt Lake 
City, approached Mr. Kessler and later Mr. Holman, who were 
building such a unit, and solicited a bid for his project 
on which he then had no plans and specifications. (R. 4,5) 
The plans and specifications were drawn by 
William Hargreaves, who acted as both architect and engineer. 
The prospective contractor, did not assist with the pre-
paration of the plans. (R. 6) The parties, after some dis-
cussion, executed an Earnest Money contract, Exhibit p-1, 
which was later supplemented by additional terms, Exhibit 
p-2. The parties later signed a construction Agreement, 
Exhibit P-3, and a supplement to General Building contract, 
Exhibit P-4. 
1-A Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The plaintiffs, in signing the contract documents, 
relied on the original plans and specifications drawn by the 
Defendant^ architect, to which a basement was, at the De-
fendants request, later added. (R. 15) 
Early on, a subcontractor arranged for by Plain-
tiffs was to demolish the premises for the salvage value, 
without additional charge. (R. 16) Before demolition 
commenced, the plaintiff, Mr. Holman, found several women 
removing items from the premises with the approval of the 
Defendant, Mrs. sorenson. The women were instructed by the 
Contractor to take nothing more from the site than they had 
already taken. As a consequence of those directions, 
Mr. Holman received a letter from p. Briton McConkie, the 
first of three attorneys to have represented the Defendants 
in these proceedings, directing Golden Spike to cease con-
struction under the "intended" Construction contract because 
the Defendant, Marjean sorenson, and not her husband, Blair 
Sorenson, was the "owner" of the property, and because the 
Contract was consummated "against her will." Mrs. Sorenson, 
the attorney said, was not "in sympathy with the proposed 
construction" and although she acknowledged that her husband 
had an interest in the property in the event of her death, 
would not "permit" the project to be built. (Exhibit P-6) 
The letter was received only 10 days after the 
Defendant, Blair sorenson, had signed the construction 
Agreement, Exhibit P-3, representing that he was the "OWNER" 
and that he had "acquired" and held the property at 2305 
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Green Street in Salt Lake City in "FEE SIMPLE.11 (See 
Recital 1) The letter threatened litigation if demolition 
continued. 
The Contractor, to facilitate the construction, 
permitted the unanticipated removal of the furnace and of 
other fixtures by the Defendants. There being, then, no 
profit in the salvage, the subcontractor for demolition 
refused to perform. Another subcontractor was then hired 
for cash. (R. 20) 
Later, in violation of the terms of the contract, 
the Defendants failed to give the notice required of the 
approval and recording of the bank loan, of the finalization 
of the plans and of the approval for construction by the 
municipal authorities. (R. 21) it fell to the plaintiffs 
to obtain the required permits, the terms of the Contract 
notwithstanding. The Defendants plans, prepared by the 
agent, Mr. Hargreaves, were not initially acceptable under 
the Code and their approval was not obtained for nearly two 
months after the construction Agreement was signed. (R. 24) 
Construction did not commence until July 27, 1973. 
During excavation, the plaintiffs struck water. 
The plans, from which the contractor was to build, had speci-
fied that the soil conditions were clay. The responsibility 
for the unanticipated problem was, contractually, that of 
the Defendants. The project was temporarily abandoned to 
see if the condition would correct itself. (R. 25) It did 
not and the plaintiffs recommendation that the Defendants 
-3-
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permanently abandon the basement, which had not been a part 
of the original plans, was ignored. (R. 27,28) New and 
revised plans were devised to implement the construction of 
a basement in the face of the water table problem and 
included, among other things, retaining walls, a plan for 
raising the foundation above grade and directions to water-
proof the concrete. (R. 28,29) 
On September 1, 1973, the parties defined the 
responsibilities for the work required by the changed plans 
in a Letter Agreement, Exhibit P-8. (R. 33) The plaintiffs 
agreed to undertake certain of the tasks (see especially 
paragraphs 3 and 4) for specified prices. Mr. sorenson, 
who was to assume responsibility for part of the construc-
tion under the arrangement between the parties, agreed to 
comply with the city ordinances respecting the construction 
of a building above grade. (R. 34) He was, among other 
things, to build the retaining walls and, Mr. Holman said, 
to provide for the backfill. 
The plaintiffs, who were to be paid for the work 
as it was completed, performed the tasks required by the 
September 1 arrangement (Exhibit P-8), but were never paid 
for the materials furnished or for their services. (R. 35, 
36,37) 
There were a multitude of other problems during 
construction. The Defendants plot plan, Mr. Hargreaves plan, 
was inaccurate and the setback was inadequate. The plain-
tiffs, because of the error in the plans, were obliged by 
-4-
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the City to remove footings already poured, dig new ones, 
move the building back and to shorten the mansard roof. 
(R. 37,38,39) Mr. Sorenson piled railroad ties at the site 
for the construction of the retaining walls. They proved to 
be an impediment to the delivery of materials and to con-
struction. The railroad ties were not permitted by the 
Building code and the idea to use the ties, instead of con-
crete, was subsequently abandoned. Mr. sorenson!s subcon-
tractor misplaced the footings on the concrete retaining 
walls, misplaced and left out necessary rebar and poured 
concrete in cold and freezing weather. (R. 41) As a result 
of poor workmanship, the wall cracked when the area was back-
filled. Dead men were required to stabilize the faulty con-
struction. (R. 42) The Defendant Sorenson who denied any 
responsibility to backfill the retaining walls did not 
complete his construction of those walls until January of 
1974, some eight months after the parties signed the original 
Construction Agreement. (R. 45,46) The City issued a stop 
order in connection with the stairs in the front of the four-
plex, Mr. sorenson1s responsibility. (R. 47,48) A variance 
was required for which additional plans had to be drawn. 
The requirement for a variance involved the necessity for a 
public hearing and a meeting with the Board of Adjustment and 
occasioned delays on the job. 
Other problems, attributable to Mr. sorenson1s 
heavy handed interference in every phase of the project, 
concerned the payment of the contractor's funds. The 
-R-
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Defendants did not deposit funds equivalent to the contract 
price in the loan-in-process account at American savings 
as permitted by the contract and agreed by the parties, 
(paragraph 3, Exhibit p-4) The Defendants deposit was short 
by $6,000.00. (R. 49,50) Failure to make such a deposit 
resulted in diminished draws to the contractor, when the 
progress payments were made, (R. 51,52) which problem was 
further exacerbated by the lenders right to deduct costs, 
(R. 52) such as construction interest, for which Mr. Sorenson 
was responsible. (R. 53) The second draw was withheld by 
Mr. Sorenson because, the Defendants claimed, there were 
pitmarks on the basement floor caused by leakage from a 
rainstorm. The amount of the draw, $8,000.00, exceeded by 
forty times the cost of the repairs for the floor, approxi-
mately $200.00, and the draw withheld did not concern con-
crete at all, but rather a payment for the lumber and mater-
ials required to bring the building to the square. (R. 54) 
The Defendants delayed construction by their con-
duct (R. 60,61,62,63,64,65) and the court so found. (Find-
ing 7, R. 525) The Defendant sorenson "many" times called 
the plaintiff, Holman, and kept him on the phone till mid-
night. (R. 58) The Defendant after initiating discussions 
with the State contractor's office, refused to submit his 
complaints to arbitration, something to which the plaintiffs 
agreed. (R. 67) The Defendant sorenson dealt directly with 
the plaintiffs subcontractors without plaintiffs approval 
(R. 75) and ordered changes in the quality and nature of the 
-6-
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finished materials required by the plans without advance 
consultation• (R. 78) 
It is clear from the record that the plaintiffs 
bid was a very good one, lower than that of the other 
bidders (R. 74) and providing for a very narrow margin of 
profit. (R. 73) it became apparent, as the project pro-
gressed, that there would be no profit for the plaintiffs 
and the Trial court's award, if fully affirmed, will not 
change the loss equation. 
The Plaintiffs, who estimated that they were only 
a day and a half from the completion of their responsibili-
ties, were dismissed from the job on May 30, 1974 (R. 78) 
by means of a letter from the Defendants second attorney, 
Mr. Hollis S. Hunt, who subsequently handled the case at 
trial. At the time of the dismissal, the plaintiffs were on 
the job hanging and adjusting doors. (R. 80) 
On August 26, 1974, the plaintiffs initiated a 
lawsuit against the Defendants, who filed a counterclaim. 
The plaintiffs testified as to their damages, 
establishing the contract price, the amount paid and the 
value of extras and credits. The court found damages in the 
amount of $7,321.00, awarding no costs or attorneys fees. 
The Defendants moved for a clarification of the judgment 
and later made a motion for a new trial. The Defendants did 
not set the latter motion for hearing, and did not appear 
when the plaintiffs did so. 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Defendant Sorenson then engaged the services 
of Mr. Rand Hirschi, a third attorney, for purposes of the 
appeal. 
It is worth noting that the Defendants subpoenaed 
sixteen witnesses to testify (Returns on service for fifteen 
are in the record at 482-515), actually calling nine and dis-
missing a number of others. The Plaintiffs testified 
themselves, Mr. Kessler very briefly, and called only one 
other witness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT X 
-THE COURT'S FINDING OF MUTUAL BREACH WAS AN EFFORT 
TO AVOID THE IMPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEES. 
Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows: 
"in any action brought to enforce any 
lien under this chapter the successful 
party shall be entitled to recover a reason-
able attorneys fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The Supplement to General Building contract, 
Exhibit P-4, provided, 
"in case of default in performance of 
this contract, the defaulting party agrees to 
pay all expense of enforcement, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee.11 
The Earnest Money, Exhibit P-l, also provided for 
an attorney fee. 
With these statutory and contractual provisions in 
mind, the plaintiffs asserted at the trial that they were 
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entitled to attorney fees of $2,400*00 incurred prior to the 
trial, and to $350,00 per day for the three to three and a 
half days spent in court. The figures were admitted by a 
Stipulation of counsel found at pages 186 and 187 of the 
record. 
The Court did not wish to impose attorney fees on 
top of the judgment and advised counsel, in chambers, in 
connection with a discussion of the attorney fee provisions, 
and before a ruling, that it might be inclined to a finding 
of mutual breach, presumably to avoid what appeared to be 
the mandatory language of the statute, 38-1-18 U.C.A. 
Counsel on this appeal, Defendants third attorney, was not 
privy to the discussion nor a participant at the trial. 
The effect of a finding of mutual breach was the 
avoidance of plaintiffs attorney fees, an advantage to the 
Defendants, such fees would have increased the judgment, 
which, considering the circumstances, was minimal, by 50%. 
The court said as much, in its direction to Counsel, which 
Appellant has included as Appendix "A" to the Brief, the 
Court said, 
"It is the Court's further opinion that 
the plaintiffs have breached the contract 
in the respects alleged by the Defendants, 
however the above computation is inclusive 
of the amounts to which they have been 
damaged and to which they are entitled; 
therefore plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
for the above amount with no attorney fees 
being awarded to either party, and each 
party to bear its own costs.fl (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The relationship of attorney fees to the finding 
that the plaintiffs had breached, an afterthought, is 
obvious. 
Appellantsf appellate counsel seeks to turn the 
finding of mutual breach into a theoretical dilemma with far 
reaching implications. The issue as to whether a contract 
has been breached is ordinarily a question of fact for the 
trier of facts if the evidence is conflicting or if different 
reasonable inferences may be drawn. See: 17 Amjur 2d, 
"Contract," section 355, p. 793, 794. it is also for the 
trier of the facts, judge sawaya in this instance, to deter-
mine from the facts and circumstances whether the omission 
of some act stipulated in the contract or a departure from 
its terms is substantial, that is whether it is a matter 
vital to the contract, material or essential, or merely an 
omission or departure in an unimportant detail. See: 
porters \f. Traders ins. Co. 164 NY 504, 58 NE 641, University 
Club v. Beakin 265 111 257, 106 NE 790. 
in this case, judge sawaya found a breach, which 
conveniently nullified Respondents' attorney's fees and 
costs, but not, the judge thought, the contractor's right to 
damages arising from the Appellants' far more serious con-
duct. 
Whereas a plaintiff cannot prevail in an action 
for nonperformance of a contract if hre alone is responsible 
for the nonperformance, Porto Rico v. Title Guaranty and s. 
Co. 227 W.S. 382, 57 L ed 561, 33 S. Ct 362, William B. 
-10-
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Hughes Produce Co. v. Pulley 47 Utah 544, 155 P. 337, if the 
impossibility of performance arises directly or even indir-
ectly from the acts of the promisee, it is a sufficient excuse 
for nonperformance. This is upon the principle that he who 
prevents a thing may not avail himself of the nonperformance 
which he has occasioned. Columbus R. power and L G v. 
Columbus 249 U.S. 399, 63 L ed 669, 39 S. Ct 349, 6 ALR 
1648, Bewick v. Mecham 26 Cal 2d 92, 156 P.2d 757, 157 ALR 
— _ _ _ _
 { 
1277, Ford v. Norton 32 NM 518, 260 p. 411 (recognizing 
principle but finding it inapplicable), Williams v. Yellow 
Pine BOX and Lumber Co. 126 wash 380, 218 P. 245. See: 
ANNOTATION: 84 ALR 2d 65 12 (b). 
Where the facts are in dispute, as they clearly 
were, where different reasonable inferences could be drawn, 
as they clearly could, judge sawaya sitting without a jury 
was entitled to determine whether one had performed, Hey-
wood v. Qgden Motor car Co. 71 Utah 417, 266 P. 1040, 62 
ALR 1323, substantially or sufficiently, New v_. New 148 cal 
App 2d 37 2, 306 P. 2d 987, or had failed to perform. See: 
Terry v. united States Fidelity and G. Co. 196 wash 206, 82 
P. 2d 532, 119 ALR 1276. 
The court concluded that the Defendants breached 
the Contract from the very beginning, in that they, 
11
 interfered with demolition, denied 
ownership of the property, caused variations 
from the plans and specifications, made un-
authorized substitutions, and despite repeated 
and continued demands, failed to make pro-
gress payments in the time and manner specified, 
failed and refused to pay for extras that 
-11-
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had been commissioned, or for the balance 
due under the contract, delayed the comple-
tion of construction, withheld percentages 
from the payments which were in fact made 
and ordered the plaintiffs, in violation and 
breach of the parties contractual arrangement, 
not to proceed with or complete the project." 
(Finding 7, R. 525) 
The plaintiffs failed to complete the project, the 
Court found, in the time specified, and left, at the time of 
their withdrawal, (they were, of course, dismissed) some 
work to be completed. (Finding 9, R. 526) 
The situation, with respect to the consequences 
of the Trial court's finding that there was a mutual breach 
and the implication of such a finding for the issue of 
damages, is well covered by traditional contract principles. 
As a rule, a party first guilty of a substantial or material 
breach of contract cannot complain if the other party there-
after refuses to perform, imperial £. ins. Co. v. coos 
County 151 U.S. 452, 38 L ed 231, 14 S. Ct 379, Williston, 
Contracts 3d ed 812 et seg. He can neither insist on per-
formance by the other party, Nakdimen v. Baker (C A 8 Ark) 
111 F. 2d 778, cert den. 311 U.S. 665, 85 L ed 427, 61 S. 
Ct 22, nor maintain an action against the other party for a 
subsequent failure to perform. Lynch v. McDonald 12 Utah 
2d 427, 367 p. 2d 464. Where a contract is not performed, 
the party who is guilty of the first breach is generally 
the one upon whom rests all the liability for the nonper-
formance. Anvil Min. Co. v;. Humble 153 U. S. 540, 38 L ed 
814, 14 S. Ct 876, Buckman v. Hill Military Academy, inc. 
190 or. 194, 223 P. 2d 172. 
-12-
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in Lynch v_. McDonald, supra, this court accepted 
the principle that the party who commits the first breach 
cannot maintain an action against the other for a subsequent 
failure to perform, under the circumstances, the owner, 
Mr. Sorenson, was not entitled to "Damages Measured By His 
Cost to complete" the project, or to any damages. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED ESTABLISHED CONTRACT 
PRINCIPLES TO THE COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
Plaintiffs Damage Recapitulation, Exhibit P-ll, 
which was illustrative of Mr. Holman's testimony, was pre-
pared according to principles enunciated in this court's 
decision in the matter of Keller v. peseret Mortuary 
Company 23 Ut 2d 1, 455 P. 2d 197. 
Deseret Mortuary, like the present Appellants, 
claimed at the trial that the plaintiff, Mr. Keller, had 
breached the contract in that he had not completed the work 
in time nor in a satisfactory or workmanlike manner. The 
Trial court found the issues for the plaintiff and awarded 
damages. This court, saying that there was "substantial, 
reasonable and credible evidence" to support the Trial 
judge's findings, chose not to overturn the court's decision 
on grounds of delay or poor workmanship. 
The Appellants, in Keller, argued that the plain-
tiffs recovery should be limited to the reasonable value of 
the work performed and the materials furnished. This court 
noted that there was a "definite contract" upon which the 
-13-
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claim of the plaintiff was based, and that the assessment 
of damages by the Trial Court was "consistent with the gen-
eral principle which underlies the ascertainment of damages 
for breach of contract: that the non-breaching party 
should receive an award which will put him in as good posi-
tion as he would have been in had there been no breach." 
Citing 5 williston on contracts, 3824, Sec. 1363; 1 Restate-
ment of Law, contracts, 578, Sec. 346, comments (g) and (h); 
5 corbin on contracts, Sec. 1094. The court found no error 
in an award of damages based upon the total amount prom-
ised for the project less the reasonable cost of completing 
it. 
The formula used by the plaintiffs in this case, 
as illustrated by Exhibit P-ll, which showed damages slight-
ly in excess of $7,300.00, and the formula used by the Trial 
judge and approved on appeal in the Keller case are virtually 
identical, p-ll was prepared with the pacific Reporter open 
to the Keller case, it includes extras, which in this in-
stance were required to ascertain the total contract price, 
and offsets and contract credits to the Appellants, which 
were, in view of the relationship between the parties, re-
quired to adjust the total contract price, otherwise, the 
formula applied looked to the contract and to the amount 
paid by the Defendants, the balance if the job had been 
completed and the reasonable cost of completion, the product 
being the measure of plaintiffs damage. 
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There can be no doubt that the Trial judge also 
relied on the Keller principle in computing damages. The 
item entitled "Credits due Defendants" on the court's 
July 9 letter to counsel, Appendix "A" to Appellants Brief, 
included, the court found, costs of completion. (Finding 9, 
R. 526) 
Reference to the Keller case at page 198 and the 
Court's letter to counsel (R., between 515 and 516), and to 
Finding 9, indicates the Court followed the standard 
enunciated in Keller. 
The Trial court concluded that the Defendants 
"breached the contract," "caused the delay in construction" 
alleged by the plaintiffs and caused damage, the amount of 
which was then specified. (July 9 letter to counsel, 
Appendix "A" to Appellants Brief) The unspecified breach 
of the plaintiffs, invoked to avoid the imposition of 
attorney's fees and costs, did not operate to avoid the 
award of damages or to remove the application of the prin-
ciples established by this court in the Keller case to 
determine the amount of such damages. The fact that the 
Court below found a breach by the plaintiffs should, under 
the circumstances, alter nothing, professor williston, 
quoted by this Court in Keller as authority for the propo-
sition that the non-breaching party may recover damages 
equivalent to the fruits of his bargain, would not quibble 
over a contractors "minor deviation from the required per-
formance." vol 11, Williston on contracts, 1363, p. 340, 
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See also: Jacob and Youngs inc. v. Kent 230 NY 239, 129 NE 
89, 23 ALR 1429, Shell v. Schmidt 164 Cal App 2d 330, 330 
P. 2d 817. 
judge sawaya, whose duty it was to determine whether 
a breach was material, a simple omission or an unimportant 
detail, did not find that the plaintiffs1 breach precluded 
the plaintiffs' claim for damages measured by Keller 
principles. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE UPHELD ON 
APPEAL. 
The Brief of the Appellants' is filled with refer-
ences to the Trial court's Findings on the issues of damage. 
It re-examines, in confusing detail, the constituent factual 
elements of the Findings and challenges their accuracy, it 
is of little value, on appeal, for this tribunal to re-try 
the case on damages or to become involved in the morass of 
detail which complicated the case from its inception. The 
facts on damages were controverted and disputed, conflictory 
and susceptible to varying inferences. The court made its 
findings based on the testimony of the witnesses and the 
proofs which were submitted, counsel submits that the 
veracity of the Defendants can be quickly ascertained, even 
from the cold record, by the most cursory examination of the 
Accounting summary, Appendix "C" to Appellants Brief. (which 
is not an Exhibit and which is improperly included in the 
Brief) The document is inflated and totally unreliable. The 
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Court's utter rejection of the summary, given the testimony 
and the circumstances, was entirely inevitable. 
The Respondents' find it unhelpful to be drawn, 
on appeal, into a minute and detailed discussion of the ele-
ments of the damage award. The evidence is in the Record, 
the Abstract and in the Damage Recapitulation, Exhibit P-ll, 
which was modified to some degree by the court, and by the 
testimony, both up and down. 
Where there is a dispute in the evidence, this 
Court has repeatedly supported the findings of the Trial 
Court, assuming that 
"....the Trial court believed those 
aspects of the evidence, and drew the in-
ferences which could fairly and reasonably 
be drawn therefrom, which tend to support 
the findings and judgment...." Casey v;. 
Nelson Brothers construction company 24 
Utah 2d 14, 465 P. 2d 173 (1970). See 
also: Winger v_. Gem State Mutual of Utah 
• 22 Ut 2d 132, 449 P. 2d 982. 
If upon the review of the record, there is a 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support the court's 
findings, they will, of course, not be disturbed. Barrett v^ 
1 
Vickers 24 Ut 2d 334, 471 P. 2d 157. There is, on this 
record, competent testimony supporting all of the court's 
critical factual findings. The Trial court made its find-
1#
 An action for breach of contract is an action at law, 
rather than equity. Flynn v^ Schocker construction Co. 23 
Ut 2d 140, 459 P. 2d 433. in an action at law, the Appel-
late court does not reverse on issues of fact where the 
Trial Court's findings are supported by the evidence or the 
absence of it. Martin v. Martin 29 Ut 2d 413, 510 P. 2d 1102. 
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ings some of which are cumulations of elements from the 
testimony of both Plaintiffs and Defendants, after hearing 
disputed and contradictory evidence from the parties* This 
Court has frequently indicated that where competent evidence 
supports the fact finder's conclusions, it cannot "substi-
tute" its judgment for that of the Trial court, even if it 
disagrees with the findings, pitcher v^ . Lauritzen 18 ut 2d 
368, 423 P. 2d 491. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT'S DECISION SHOULD RESOLVE, FINALLY 
AND FOREVER, THE ISSUES BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The decision in this case should, finally and 
forever, resolve all matters in controversy between the 
parties. The Trial court, and judge Stewart M. Hanson, jr., 
earlier in the record, forever barred lien claims of other 
potential claimants as against the property in question, 
excluding only the claims of the plaintiffs and those of 
Fashion cabinets Manufacturing, inc. The Plaintiffs, who 
have been delayed in receiving payment for their work for 
several years, should, as a result of this decision, be 
fully free from further problems with these Defendants. 
This decision, and the decision of the Trial court, should 
be res judicata on all issues between these parties as a 
result of the agreement for the construction of a fourplex 
at 2305 Green Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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CONCLUSION 
* 
The Trial court did not award the plaintiffs 
their attorney fees or costs, nor did its computation in-
clude the full face value of the extras asserted by the 
Plaintiffs, in the face of some orchestrated confusion, 
concerning damages, the court kept its own counsel making, 
apparently, some deductions and additions for which there 
was and is no precise itemization. Balancing the claims of 
the litigants, evidenced by a confusing record, the court 
arrived at its figures, independently, after the trial con-
cluded. The court recorded counsel's final arguments which, 
while unreported, contained the somewhat modified figures 
which remained at the conclusion of all the evidence, it 
found the extras to amount to $3,900.00, a reduction of over 
$1,500.00 from the amount the Plaintiffs initially claimed. 
Where factual findings are confusing and dis-
puted, technically based, it is difficult to match the ad-
vantaged position of the lower court. The Trial Court was 
able to gauge, first hand, the credibility of the parties 
and the problems raised by vastly contradictory facts. 
The findings of the determiner of the facts, be-
cause of his close proximity to the witnesses and the trial 
and because he is the exclusive judge of the credibility 
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2 
of witnesses and of the "weight to be given evidence", 
should be upheld on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOEL M. ALLRED 
Attorney for Respondents 
2m
 pevas v. Noble 13 Ut 2d 133, 369 P. 2d 290 (1962) 
certiorari denied — s. Ct 37, 371 U.S. 821, 9 L ed 61, 
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